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DISENTANGLING GUT FEELING 
ASSESSING THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes how social investors evaluate the integrity of social entrepreneurs. Based on an experiment 
with 40 professionals and 40 students, we investigate how five attributes of the entrepreneur contribute to the 
assessment of integrity. These attributes are the entrepreneur’s personal experience, professional background, 
voluntary accountability efforts, reputation and awards/fellowships granted to the entrepreneur. We find that 
social investors focus largely on voluntary accountability efforts of the entrepreneur and the entrepreneur’s 
reputation when judging integrity.  For an overall positive judgment of integrity, it was sufficient if either 
reputation or voluntary accountability efforts of the entrepreneur were high. By comparing professionals with 
students, we show that experience leads to a simpler decision model focusing on key attributes.  
 
Keywords: social entrepreneur, social investor, integrity, conjoint analysis, venture philanthropy 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Social entrepreneurs are individuals trying to solve a social problem through an 
entrepreneurial approach  (Achleitner et al., 2007;  Witkamp et al., 2011).  They pursue  a 
double bottom line consisting of social and financial goals (Mair & Marti, 2006; Martin & 
Osberg, 2007). A key challenge for social entrepreneurs is to find external capital to support 
their venture, particularly in early stages of company development (Tracey & Philipps, 2007; 
Miller & Wesley, 2010). Social investors have emerged in recent years as a potential source 
of capital for social entrepreneurs. Their aim is to create social impact by providing financial 
as well as non-financial support to social entrepreneurs (Scarlata & Alemany, 2008; John, 
2007). In regard to the goal of creating a financial return, many different business models of 
social investors can be differentiated. Some organizations  view their investments as a    
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donation without any payback obligation. Others have the goal to at least recuperate their 
investment or to even gain a financial return (Bridges Ventures & Parthenon Group, 2010). 
Social entrepreneurs and social investors can be described as “two sides of one coin” because 
of their focus on a double bottom line (Martin, 2004). 
Despite the increasing relevance of social entrepreneurs as well as social investors around the 
globe in recent years (Achleitner et al., 2007; Kerlin, 2006; John, 2006), little research was so 
far undertaken to understand the relationship between these two parties. In particular, it is not 
yet well understood how a relationship comes to be  (exceptions are  Achleitner et al., 
forthcoming; Scarlata & Alemany, 2009). In this paper, we analyze selection criteria used by 
social investors in order to evaluate social entrepreneurs applying for funding. We focus on 
the integrity of the entrepreneur as one important aspect in the evaluation process. Our aim is 
to understand the mechanisms used by social investors to judge the integrity of the 
entrepreneur. Integrity is defined as honoring one’s word and acting in accordance with a 
morally justifiable value system (Pollmann, 2005; Erhard et al., 2010). 
One key challenge for social investors is that social entrepreneurs might get too focused on 
financial goals on the expense of social goals (Spear et al., 2007). The entrepreneur would 
then drift away from the  initial  purpose  of creating primarily  a social return (so called 
mission drift,  Heister, 2010).  Entrepreneurs  have different opportunities to  position 
themselves among financial and social return (Alter, 2004). It may even be rational for an 
individual to portray himself as a social entrepreneur with only a subordinate profit motive in 
order to acquire relatively cheap sources of capital  from social investors.  In addition to 
mission drift, the social impact may also be harmed by unethical behavior of the entrepreneur 
in the course of company development. Social entrepreneurs may decide for unethical 
behavior because they assume the end justifies their means (Zahra et al., 2009). The risk of a 
mission drift or unethical behavior is aggravated as social entrepreneurs often operate in areas    
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of scant oversight (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001)  and are not limited by traditional market 
mechanisms which drive inefficient organizations out of the market (Zahra et al., 2009). In 
addition, it is still difficult to assess the success of social ventures as universal performance 
indicators for social impact do not exist (Austin et al., 2006; Barman, 2007). Furthermore, it 
is often not possible to attribute the social impact  to a single organization (Van Slyke, 2007; 
Dees & Anderson, 2002). Monitoring is hence difficult and high informational asymmetries 
between social investors and social entrepreneurs can occur. Investors are therefore more 
dependent on the trustworthiness of the entrepreneur  than in the non-social sector. 
Trustworthiness is also important because social investors provide the investee with access to 
their network, an exclusive circle with a range of benefits (e.g. management consulting, legal 
advice). Untrustworthy behavior within this circle can cause damage for the members. Social 
investors will try to protect their network by only funding trustworthy entrepreneurs. 
Therefore, social investors apply a multi-stage selection processes to find appropriate social 
entrepreneurs which will use their funds efficiently and pursue a long-term social mission. 
Within this selection process, trustworthiness of the entrepreneur is relevant as it acts as a 
signal for the future behavior of the entrepreneur. Perceived integrity is a key antecedent of 
trust (Mayer et al., 1995) which was also confirmed in initial  interviews with social 
investment managers we undertook prior to setting up the research design for this study. 
Integrity gives an indication whether the social entrepreneur will pursue his social mission 
and the double bottom line in the long term.  
Despite its relevance, only limited knowledge exists to date on how external investors judge 
the integrity of entrepreneurs. Our aim is to close this research gap by analyzing selection 
criteria used by social investors in order to evaluate the integrity of social entrepreneurs 
applying for funding. Our study is based on an experiment with 40 social investment experts 
where they had to rank constructed profiles of social entrepreneurs according to how they    
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would judge the integrity of the entrepreneur. As pre-defined attributes of the entrepreneur, 
we used  personal as well as professional background, voluntary accountability  efforts, 
reputation and awards/fellowships.  Furthermore, the experiment was conducted with 40 
students with academic knowledge in the area of social entrepreneurship to test whether 
experience had an influence on the assessment of integrity. 
Our study  adds  to the theoretical discussion  of integrity. We show how an  individual’s 
integrity, in our case the integrity of a social entrepreneur, is evaluated by outsiders such as 
external capital providers before the two parties form a relationship. We found that experts 
from the social investment arena judge the integrity of social entrepreneurs based on 
primarily two key attributes: voluntary accountability efforts and reputation. Furthermore, we 
show that experience influences the evaluation of integrity. By comparing the results of 
professionals and students, we find that experience leads to a simpler decision model with an 
increased focus on key elements. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Although researchers have suggested a range of definitions for social entrepreneurship (e.g. 
Dees, 2001; Mair & Marti, 2006; Zahra et al., 2009), there is not yet a commonly accepted 
definition. However, the pursuit of a double bottom line approach with social and financial 
goals  typically distinguishes social enterprises from  for-profit enterprises and nonprofit 
organizations  (Achleitner, et al., forthcoming).  The increasing importance of social 
entrepreneurs has spurred the development of social investors that provide capital in 
alignment with the specific financing needs of social entrepreneurs. These capital providers 
include e.g. venture philanthropy funds, social venture capital funds,  impact bonds  or 
foundations with an adjusted funding approach which do not solely focus on funding single    
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projects. They all provide financial as well as non-financial support to their investees. Further 
characteristics are long-term support of innovative social enterprises, a predefined exit 
strategy, continuous performance measurement and an intense selection process (John, 2006; 
Achleitner, 2007; Grenier, 2006). Within the selection process, investors examine criteria like 
social mission, concept or innovation (Miller & Wesley, 2010). Furthermore, characteristics 
of the social entrepreneur are considered in order to assess his skills as well as his personal fit 
with the investor. Integrity is an important criterion in order to assess the personal fit of a 
social entrepreneur. Simons (2002) defines integrity as the perceived pattern of alignment 
between an actor’s words and deeds. Perceived integrity is a prerequisite for trustworthiness 
(Glaeser et al., 2000; Mayer et al., 1995) because “a person who is perceived as not doing 
what he says might have substantial difficulties in establishing any trust at all” (Simons, 
2002). Integrity has been identified as a relevant personal trait when selecting individuals. 
Chrisman, Chao and Sharma (1998) found that integrity was even more important than 
trustworthiness for the selection of successors in family firms. For personnel selection in 
general, integrity tests are shown to be useful in order to predict dishonest behavior (Ones & 
Viswesvaran, 2001).  Judgments on integrity are often based on intuition or gut feeling 
(Jankowicz & Hisrich, 1987). Our aim is to disentangle the black box of the evaluation of 
integrity by identifying attributes that might influence gut feeling on integrity and empirically 
testing those attributes. 
From a theoretical point of view, two different perspectives may be relevant for the 
perception of integrity of a social entrepreneur. First, social investors may focus on attributes 
of the social entrepreneur. These attributes include the motivation of a social entrepreneur, 
his background and his efforts to increase the transparency of his activities. Second, external 
judgments of the social entrepreneur might influence the evaluation of integrity. Reputation 
in the sector and awards/fellowships granted to the entrepreneur are sources for external    
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judgments. We analyze how these  attributes of the social entrepreneur and external 
judgments shape the evaluation of integrity by social investors. After a theoretical elaboration 
on the relevance of five attributes namely the entrepreneur’s personal experience, 
professional background, voluntary accountability efforts, reputation and awards/fellowships, 
we use conjoint analysis to empirically test the importance of these attributes. 
Personal experience of the social entrepreneur 
Social investors usually assess the entrepreneur’s motivation as well as the origin of her 
motivation prior to their investment (Achleitner & Heister, 2009). Entrepreneurs need to be 
intrinsically  motivated  to establish a venture as they are likely to face challenges in the 
process of creating and scaling their ventures. As with any new venture, these challenges can 
lead to frustration of the entrepreneur and he may even decide to abandon the project. 
However, highly motivated social entrepreneurs are likely to pursue their mission even at 
difficult times (Martin & Osberg, 2007). Furthermore, the origin of the motivation of a social 
entrepreneur is important as it can be an indication for the entrepreneur’s goal. A high social 
motivation can act as signal for perseverance of the entrepreneur and reduces the risk that the 
entrepreneur will drift away from his social mission.  
Barendsen and Gardner (2004) found that the motivation of social entrepreneurs originates 
mostly from a personal experience of the problem addressed by their social venture. Personal 
experience implies that the social entrepreneur or close relatives and friends are or were 
affected by the social issue addressed (e.g. unemployment, social exclusion or violence). 
These experiences developed into deeply rooted beliefs and result in a high social motivation 
(Barendsen & Gardner, 2004). As personal experience increases the social motivation we 
propose:     
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Hypotheses 1: Social investors  will evaluate the integrity of a social 
entrepreneur more positive if the social entrepreneur has a personal 
experience of the problem he is trying to solve. 
Professional background of the social entrepreneur 
The professional background of the social entrepreneur might also influence the evaluation of 
integrity by social investors. As a social entrepreneur applies business principles within the 
social sector, it would be helpful if he had experience in the business as well as the social 
sector.  However, social entrepreneurs mostly have a background  in  either  one of these 
sectors. Regarding the integrity of a social entrepreneur, there are different aspects which 
may explain how the professional background shapes the assessment of integrity.  
Social entrepreneurs with a business background often face high financial opportunity costs 
when working in the social sector due to low salaries as well as limited profit opportunities 
and therefore seem to be highly committed. Furthermore, Miller and Wesley (2010) consider 
experience in the business sector as an indicator for the success of the social enterprise. 
However, actors with a business background do not seem to identify themselves with their 
social purpose as much as actors from the social sector (Miller & Wesley, 2010).  
Prior experience in the social sector is assumed to be a signal for a high social commitment, 
altruistic motivation and possession of a strong value system (Miller & Wesley, 2010). Social 
entrepreneurs with a social background have shown through their prior career choice that 
they are committed to creating a social value instead of aiming for a high financial income. 
Therefore, social entrepreneurs with a professional background in the social sector may be 
less inclined to increase the financial return by reducing the social return of the venture. 
However, social entrepreneurs with a social background might lack incentives as well as 
know-how to professionalize and scale their venture as they often put a high emphasis on    
 
- 8 - 
 
working directly with their target group and less emphasis on general business tasks like 
reporting or developing a growth strategy. This might lead to conflicts with social investors.  
From the theoretical considerations no clear preference for social or business background 
regarding the evaluation of the integrity of a social entrepreneur can be derived. On the one 
hand, business background seems to be a signal for high social commitment due to high 
financial opportunity costs. On the other hand, background in the social sector seems to 
reduce the risk of a mission drift. We  assume that the  evaluation of the professional 
background of a social entrepreneur is influenced by the professional background of the rater: 
While evaluating the integrity, social investors prefer social entrepreneurs which have a 
background similar to their own. The existence of such a similarity bias was already shown in 
various contexts. Venture capitalists  prefer business entrepreneurs  similar to themselves 
concerning field of education and type of professional background  (Franke et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, similarity biases occur in employee selection and the selection of business 
associates (Anderson & Shackleton, 1990 for job interviews; Lichtenthal & Tellefsen, 2001 
for business relationships). Moreover,  Coleman (1990) and Barr (1999) found  that most 
individuals are inclined to trust those similar to themselves which we reflect in the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypotheses 2: Social investors  will evaluate the integrity of a social 
entrepreneur more positive if the social entrepreneur has the same professional 
background.  
Voluntary accountability efforts of the social entrepreneur 
A social entrepreneur can signal the social investor that he is a person of integrity and 
committed to the pursuit of a double bottom line through voluntary accountability efforts. 
Due to the lack of transparency in the social sector (Austin et al., 2006), accountability efforts 
are of particular importance for social ventures. They refer to disclosures of reports or the set-   
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up of a corporate governance structure and other mechanisms which facilitate external control 
(e.g. certification programs or memberships in umbrella associations). Disclosures of reports 
decrease informational asymmetries between investors and social entrepreneurs  (Young, 
2006). Furthermore, disclosures of social impact measurements serve to legitimize the 
existence of a social enterprise (Nicholls, 2005). The social entrepreneur might also set up an 
advisory board or appoint non-executive members to the board of directors. They control and 
monitor the activities of the social enterprise and thereby objectify important management 
decisions.  The inclusion  of advisory boards  or non-executive members to the board of 
directors reduces possibilities for opportunistic behavior of the social entrepreneur (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). The setup of advisory boards has decreased fraught in the nonprofit sector 
(Greenlee et al., 2007). Social investors often require a seat in the advisory board or the 
formation of an advisory board as a prerequisite for funding a social venture (Martin & John, 
2006).  Certifications or memberships  in umbrella organizations are other  mechanisms to 
reduce informational asymmetries by showing the willingness to have external visibility 
(Gugerty, 2009).  
Overall, voluntary accountability efforts increase the external control of social entrepreneurs, 
help to reduce informational asymmetries between social entrepreneurs and social investors 
and thus might help to mitigate the risk of a mission drift or unethical behavior. If the social 
entrepreneur allows this form of external control, it may be a signal for his integrity. 
Therefore, we posit: 
Hypotheses 3: Social investors will evaluate the integrity of a social 
entrepreneur more positive if the social entrepreneur engages in voluntary 
accountability efforts.    
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External judgments of the social entrepreneur 
The first three attributes were linked to the social entrepreneur and his efforts to signal 
transparency.  For the  assessment of a social entrepreneur’s integrity,  it is furthermore 
important how the social entrepreneur is perceived by others within the sector.  Opinions of 
others are relevant in the social sector because this sector is characterized by a tight network 
of stakeholders with diverse interests (Anheier, 1995). The stakeholders within this network 
are dependent on each other, e.g. for volunteering or pro bono services (e.g. Jansen et al., 
2010). Furthermore, the interconnectedness within the society is of high importance for the 
success of social organizations (Kreutzer & Jäger, 2008). Moreover, the reputation of the 
social investor is also linked to the public perception of the entrepreneurs she supports. 
Therefore, external judgments have an influence on the financing decisions of social 
investors (Padanyi & Gainer, 2003; Austin et al., 2006). Market players state their opinions 
about a social entrepreneur in selection committees of awards/fellowships within the sector. 
Furthermore, opinions of third parties are reflected in the reputation of a social entrepreneur. 
The distinction between awards/fellowships and reputation is that social entrepreneurs often 
receive awards for the facilitation of their future plans, whereas reputation is based on past 
actions (Fombrun, 1996; Podolny, 1994).  
Reputation of the social entrepreneur 
Reputation refers to stakeholders’ evaluation and is based on information about past actions 
and performance (Fombrun, 1996). The perceived trustworthiness of a social entrepreneur is 
influenced by her reputation (Szper & Prakash, 2011). Social investors assess the reputation 
of a social entrepreneur by asking peers and experts in the sector for their feedback. Thereby, 
they build expectations about the future behavior of an entrepreneur (Duffner 2003). Thus, 
social investors put strong emphasis on the reputation of an entrepreneur for their funding 
decisions (Padanyi & Gainer, 2003; Austin et al., 2006). Reputation is especially relevant for    
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the assessment of young enterprises as there is not much public information available about 
these enterprises.  
In case of unethical or untrustworthy behavior of an entrepreneur, information about such 
behavior can be spread by affected people in order to harm her reputation. Therefore, a high 
reputation seems to be a signal for trustworthy behavior  in the past (Ensminger, 2001). 
Furthermore, it reduces the incentive of the entrepreneur for untrustworthy behavior in the 
future as this would destroy the reputation which she has built up  (Diamond, 1989). 
Information of third parties should be reliable as they do not have an incentive to provide 
misleading information which could reduce  their own reputation  (Meyerson et al., 1996; 
Handy, 1995).  
A high reputation can be a signal of integrity because it mirrors past behavior of the social 
entrepreneur and deters him from untrustworthy behavior. Therefore, we anticipate: 
Hypotheses  4:  Social investors  will evaluate the integrity of a social 
entrepreneur more positive if the social entrepreneur has a high reputation. 
Awards / Fellowships granted to the social entrepreneur 
Awards and fellowships are common in the social sector and regularly awarded to promising 
social entrepreneurs. For social investors such prize competitions are a valuable deal flow 
source  because  social entrepreneurs are preselected through these awards  (Achleitner & 
Heister, 2009). For business entrepreneurs, it has already been shown that awards received by 
entrepreneurs increase the likelihood to receive funding by venture capitalists (Lerner, 1999). 
Prize competitions include intense  selection processes and thus help to increase the 
transparency of the social sector. Award or fellowships granted to a social entrepreneur are an 
indicator that others have perceived the social entrepreneur as promising and trustworthy. 
Furthermore, awarded organizations receive more public attention (Fombrun, 1996) and thus    
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are more likely to be under public scrutiny. This public scrutiny reduces the incentive for 
unethical or untrustworthy behavior. We propose: 
Hypotheses  5:  Social investors  will evaluate the integrity of a social 
entrepreneur more positive if the social entrepreneur has received awards or 
fellowships. 
Influence of experience on the evaluation of integrity  
The evaluation of integrity of a person seems to be a complicated task which is based on hard 
facts as well as on aspects like gut feeling (Ashoka, 2007; Jankowicz & Hisrich, 1987). 
Evaluating the integrity of a social entrepreneur is even more complex as social entrepreneurs 
are pursuing a double bottom line approach and are not just fulfilling a single purpose 
(Achleitner, Spiess-Knafl, et al., forthcoming). Thus, their integrity concerning the fulfillment 
of two often conflicting purposes has to be assessed. The experience of the evaluator is likely 
to have an influence on  the way integrity is judged. Prior studies on the influence of 
experience either found that experts have a more elaborated decision system taking into 
account more attributes than novices (Shanteau, 1992) or that they have simpler decision 
models than inexperienced decision makers (Lurigio & Carroll, 1985) and only focus on a 
small number of key factors (Shepherd et al., 2003).  In order to test the influence of 
experience on the evaluation of integrity,  we  analyze differences between  experts and 
students. We propose that experience has an influence on the evaluation of integrity and 
therefore we posit: 
Hypotheses 6: Social investors  will evaluate the integrity of a social 
entrepreneur different than students.    
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METHOD 
Scholars often investigate decision policies of managers using post-hoc methodologies, such 
as  questionnaires  or interviews  (Shepherd & Zacharakis, 1999;  MacMillan et al., 1987; 
Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). While these methods can yield important insights on the decision 
making process, they also have some disadvantages. The use of  post-hoc self-reported data, 
can cause biases such as recall bias and post hoc rationalization bias (Shepherd & Zacharakis, 
1999). Furthermore, decision makers often lack introspection into their own decision policies 
or bias the results by intent (Franke et al., 2006). Conjoint analysis allows researchers to 
collect data as the decision is made and thereby overcomes many of the limitations of post-
hoc methods. For investigating the evaluation of integrity, real-time methods are better able 
to portray the gut feeling of the participant in the decision process compared to post-hoc 
interviews. In conjoint analysis, participants are evaluating several constructed profiles which 
consist of  combinations of parameter values of several attributes. Decision  policies of 
participants are deducted from their evaluations of these profiles. Conjoint analysis allows to 
assess  the  significance level of the attributes  as well as the relative importance of each 
attribute in the decision process (Shepherd & Zacharakis, 1999).  Furthermore, trade-offs 
between different parameter values of the attributes can be quantified.   
Metricized  Limit Conjoint Analysis (MCLA): Methodological advancement in 
entrepreneurship research  
There are two measurement methods to obtain the evaluations of the participants of a conjoint 
study. First, participants can rate the profiles on a predefined Likert scale. The advantage of 
rating is that it provides metric data. Second, participants can rank the profiles in order of the 
dependent variable. The main advantage of this measurement method is  an increased 
manageability due to better haptics (Baierl & Grichnik, 2010). In addition, the participant    
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evaluates all profiles simultaneously in the ranking process. It is hence less likely that he will 
change his evaluation pattern in the process of the experiment which can increase reliability 
(Teichert, 2001). However, conjoint studies which use ranking for data collection only obtain 
ordinal data. So far, utility values of the ranked profiles were mostly calculated with the 
unrealistic assumption of equal distances between the profiles (Baierl & Grichnik, 2010). The 
approach used in our study, metricized  limit conjoint analysis (MLCA), combines the 
advantage of increased information content through metric data with the advantages of 
ranking methods (Baierl & Grichnik, 2010). MLCA, which was developed by Baierl and 
Grichnik (2010), is based upon limit conjoint analysis (LCA). In LCA participants rank the 
profiles in a first step and are asked in a second step to place a limit card behind the last 
acceptable profile (Voeth & Hahn, 1998). The inclusion of a limit card leads to a separation 
of acceptable and non-acceptable profiles. In a study using MLCA, participants additionally 
are able to adjust distances between ranked profiles by placing wildcards. Wildcards are 
blank cards which can be placed between profiles in order to portray differences in the 
distance between profiles. Participants are free to choose if they want to include any 
wildcards. Via usage of wildcards ordinal scaled data is converted into interval scaled data 
(Baierl & Grichnik, 2010). Utility values of the profiles are calculated using the following 
formula1: 
𝑼???? = �
𝑳?? + 𝑱??𝑳?? − ?????? + 𝛎.𝛓     ????     ?????? ≤ 𝑳??
𝑳?? − 𝑱𝑳???? − ?????? + 𝛎.𝛓     ????     ?????? > 𝑳??
 
𝑼???? = ?????????????? ?????????? ???? ???????????????? ?? ?????? ?????????????????????? ?? 
𝑳?? = ?????????????? ?????????? ???????? ?????? ?????????? ???????? ?????? ????????????????????  
𝑱??𝑳?? = ?????? ???? ?????? ?????????????????? ?????????????? ???????????????? ?? ?????? 𝑳?? 
𝑱𝑳???? = ?????? ???? ?????? ?????????????????? ?????????????? 𝑳?? ?????? ???????????????? ?? 
?????? = ?????????????? ???? ???????????????? ?? ???? ?????????????????????? ?? 
                                                 
1 In comparison to Baierl und Grichnik (2010) the limit card is not interpreted as an additional wildcard.    
 
- 15 - 
 
See Figure I for an example of the ranking process including profiles, wildcards and the limit 
card. 
Sample  
Our sample consists  of experts who  are  actively involved in the selection  of social 
entrepreneurs  as well as students in the field of social entrepreneurship.  For the expert 
sample, we focused on investment managers of social venture capital funds and consultants 
of social investors. The directory of the European Venture Philanthropy Association and a list 
of John (2006) were used to identify potential participants. The participants were based in all 
major European countries. In total, 50 experts were contacted and 40 agreed to participate in 
our study. This represents a response rate of 80%. The average experience of the experts with 
social investments was 5.6 years. 85% have a university degree as highest degree. 50% have 
a background (education and previous experience) in the social sector, 50% in business. 68% 
of the participants are male.  
Additionally,  students with academic knowledge in the area of social entrepreneurship 
participated in our study. Overall, 47 students were contacted and 40 agreed to participate, 
leading to a response rate of 85%. The students did not have any practical experience with 
social investments. They were mainly enrolled in business programs (88%) but all of them 
had attended at least one course on social entrepreneurship prior to the experiment. Table I 
presents characteristics of our sample. 
Data collection 
We either met the participants in person to undertake the experiment or we guided them 
through a web implementation via phone. Prior to the ranking exercise, we explained our 
definition  of integrity as described above and characterized the hypothetical  social    
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entrepreneurs which were to be evaluated. Specifically, participants were told to assume that 
the social entrepreneurs, which they had to evaluate later on, achieve a clear social impact, 
are innovative and that their concepts have already been implemented successfully in pilot 
projects.  Hence,  we focus on the second stage of the selection process after  the social 
entrepreneur already passed an initial screening. The participants then had to rank the profiles 
according to their perceived integrity from highest to lowest. In a second step, participants 
were asked to include a limit card behind the last acceptable profile. Thereby, the ranked 
profiles are divided into non-acceptable profiles and profiles where the perceived integrity is 
high enough to consider the social entrepreneur for further evaluation. In a third  step, 
participants were able to adjust distances between ranked profiles using wildcards. In order to 
test participants reliability, they then had to rate two replicated profiles on a scale of -10 to 
+10. The conjoint task was followed by a post-experiment survey to obtain the participant’s 
perception of the experiment and his or her introspection. Overall, 66% of the participants 
found the inclusion of wildcards helpful to portray the values of the profiles more precisely.  
Measures 
The dependent variable in this study is the perception of the social entrepreneur’s integrity. 
The profiles of the hypothetical social entrepreneurs in our experiment entail five attributes 
which represent the independent variables and stem from the theoretical framework described 
above. Each attribute was presented at two levels:  
(1) Personal Experience: affected; not affected 
(2) Professional Background: mainly in social sector; mainly in business 
(3) Voluntary accountability efforts: high; low 
(4) Reputation: high; not high  
(5) Awards/Fellowships: yes; now    
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Table II presents a complete definition of each of the attributes and the parameter values used 
in the conjoint analysis. We tested the attributes and parameter values in discussions with five 
experts from the sector (two investment managers of  social venture funds,  two social 
entrepreneurs and a lawyer active in this field). They confirmed the face validity for attributes 
and their levels.  
For five attributes each with two levels, there are 32 (2
5) possible combinations for  the 
profiles. In order to make the decision-making task more manageable, we used an orthogonal 
fractional factorial design to reduce the number of parameter value combinations (Green & 
Srinivasan, 1978). Our fractional factorial design resulted in eight profiles with which all 
main effects were testable. Additionally, we included two hold-out profiles which were not 
used to estimate the coefficients of the model but to measure the predictive ability of the 
model. Additionally, one limit card and 16 wildcards were offered to participants. Only one 
participant used all 16 wildcards. Therefore, we assume that 16 wildcards were sufficient. 
Analysis 
In order to calculate the influence of the parameter values on  the perception of a social 
entrepreneur’s integrity, we model the utility values as a continuous function of the five 
attributes. Each attribute j (j=1,…,5) enters the equation with one parameter value xj, the 
coefficients of the remaining parameter values are implicitly set to zero (dummy variable 
technique). Furthermore,  we employ a variable  Sik  which  has  the  value  of  one if the 
participant i has a business background and the background stated on profile k is social in 
order to test for the similarity bias concerning professional background.  




The study provides 8 observations per participant for the calculations of the coefficients. 
With 40 experts and 40 students, there are a total of 640 observations. Even though this    
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implies a large number of degrees of freedom, there may be autocorrelation because the 640 
observations are nested within 80  individuals.  Therefore, we used hierarchical linear 
modeling (HLM) to analyze the data  because it accounts for individual level variance 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  The intraclass correlation, a measure of dependence of 




Result of experts  
A majority of the individual models of experts’ decision policies (67.5%) explained a 
significant proportion of variance (p<0.1) with a mean R
2  of  0.95. It was possible to 
reproduce the utility values of the hold-out profiles correctly with the coefficients calculated 
(Kendall Tau for hold-outs = 1.00, p < 0.01). The test-retest reliability of the rankings was 
analyzed using two replicated profiles, which were ranked on a scale. We did not replicate all 
profiles as this would have overstrained time capacity of our participants. Overall, 88% of the 
participants rated the profiles correctly relatively to the position of their limit card, meaning 
that if the profile was previously ranked before the limit card the profile was rated positively, 
if after negatively. This shows that participants have a high level of consistency in judgment. 
Results are reported in Table III,  which includes parameter values, coefficients, 
corresponding standard errors, t-values and levels of significance. Model 1 displays the 
effects of all five attributes on the evaluation of integrity. Model 2 accounts for the similarity 
bias concerning professional background by including an interaction term for that attribute 
additional to the coefficients of all attributes. It is shown that the effects of existence of 
personal experience (coefficient = 0.925; p < 0.01), high accountability efforts (coefficient =    
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4.000; p < 0.01), high reputation (coefficient = 4.063; p < 0.01) and  awards/fellowships 
granted to the social entrepreneur (coefficient = 1.738; p < 0.01) were significant and 
positive, providing support for Hypotheses 1, 3, 4 and 5. There is no significant preference 
for professional background in the social sector (coefficient = 0.250; p > 0.1). Hypotheses 2 
predicts that raters will judge integrity more positive if there is similarity between the rater’s 
and the social entrepreneur’s professional background. It is shown that background in the 
social sector leads to a benefit contribution of 0.720 (p < 0.1) for raters who have a similar 
background. On the contrary, raters with a business background judge experience in the 
social sector negatively (coefficient = -0.220; p < 0.1).  
Our approach allows a meaningful comparison of attributes beyond a mere ordering of their 
importance. The importance of an attribute is calculated by relating the absolute parameter 
value of that attribute to the sum of all absolute parameter values. As Figure II illustrates, 
reputation (36.3%) and accountability efforts (35.7%) are by far the most important 
attributes. For an overall positive judgment of integrity of the social entrepreneur, it was 
sufficient for experts if either reputation or accountability efforts were high. Both attributes 
are more than twice as important as awards/fellowships (15,5%). Personal experience only 
accounts for 8.3% and professional background for 4.2% of the overall judgment. 
Comparison to results of students 
We now explore whether experience with social investments has an effect on the evaluation 
of integrity. Table IV entails the utility values for students. Overall, we find that both, experts 
and students,  attach the highest importance to the attributes accountability efforts and 
reputation and the lowest to professional background. However, our analysis also reveals 
some key differences, providing support for Hypotheses 6. To identify how the results of 
experts differ from the results of students we calculated the results for the whole sample and 
interacted all terms with a dummy variable Δi that turns one if the participant is an expert.    
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For the results see Table V. Figure III shows how the evaluations of experts differ from those 
of students. There are two significant differences  in the benefit contributions:  Personal 
experience is more important for students (coefficient = 1.819; p < 0.01) than it is for experts 
(coefficient = 0.925; p < 0.01). The opposite is true for reputation, which is judged as more 
important by experts (coefficient = 4.063; p < 0.01) than by students (coefficient = 3.531; p < 
0.01).  Furthermore, no similarity bias is found for students. They have a significant 
preference for social background (coefficient = 0.931, p < 0.01).  
Concerning the overall assessment of integrity, evaluations of students are driven by a more 
balanced combination of the five attributes than evaluations of experts who strongly 
concentrate on the key factors reputation and accountability efforts. For students, a high 
reputation (coefficient = 3.531; p < 0.01) or high voluntary accountability efforts (coefficient 
= 4.456; p < 0.01) were stand-alone not sufficient for an overall positive judgment. Thus, 
experts deploy a simpler decision model than students. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The objective of our study was to understand how social investors evaluate the integrity of 
social entrepreneurs. Based on an  experiment with 40 professionals and 40 students, we 
explore the importance of five attributes for judging integrity: the entrepreneur’s personal 
experience, professional background, voluntary accountability efforts, reputation and 
awards/fellowships granted to the entrepreneur.  
Our findings indicate that the assessment of integrity by social investors is mainly driven by 
two attributes. First, voluntary accountability efforts such as disclosures of reports, corporate    
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governance structures or presence of external control are of high relevance. The  second 
attribute is the reputation of a social entrepreneur.  For an overall positive judgment of 
integrity of the social entrepreneur, it was sufficient if either accountability efforts or 
reputation were high. Of minor importance were awards/fellowships granted to the social 
entrepreneur as well as his personal experience with the social issue addressed by his venture. 
For professional background, we found that participants from the social sector have a 
preference for social entrepreneurs from the same sector.  A comparison of the results of 
professionals and students indicates that experience influences the assessment of integrity. 
Professionals strongly concentrate on the key factors reputation and accountability efforts, 
whereas evaluations of students are driven by a more balanced combination of all five 
attributes.  
Our paper contributes to theory by further analyzing the selection process of social investors. 
In this particular context, the judgment of the social entrepreneur’s integrity is particularly 
relevant due to high informational asymmetries, agency costs and limited monitoring 
possibilities. By showing relative importance of different attributes and trade-offs between 
attributes, we add to research on integrity and social entrepreneurship. Furthermore, we add 
to past research in which only single factors of integrity were analyzed separately. 
We used conjoint analysis to obtain our results. It is often criticized that conjoint analyses do 
not adequately portray decision tasks (Shepherd & Zacharakis, 1999) as artificial decisions 
are simulated (Böhler & Scigliano, 2009). However, the evaluation of profiles has an 
advantage over  questions asked in surveys or interviews about the preferences of the 
participants because recall and post hoc rationalization bias of the participants are reduced 
(Riquelme & Rickards, 1992). Construct validity is another limitation which often appears in 
conjoint experiments because  the criteria are predefined and cannot  be selected by the    
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participants (Shepherd & Zacharakis, 1999). We validated our criteria in interviews with 
experts prior to the experiment in order to avoid this shortcoming.  
Insights on the black box of evaluating integrity are important for social investors as well as 
for social entrepreneurs. Social investors can use the findings in order to understand their 
selection process. For social entrepreneurs, the findings are helpful for  preparing  their 
funding application. For instance, social entrepreneurs could increase their voluntary 
accountability efforts, e.g. by setting up an advisory board, in order to positively influence the 
judgment of social investors. Our results are also relevant for the for-profit sector in which it 
is important for venture capitalists to evaluate the integrity of business entrepreneurs prior to 
their investment (Harrison et al., 1997). 
While we are able to explain what kind of constructs social investors use to evaluate integrity, 
it is not possible to link our results to the ex-post behavior of the entrepreneur. It would be 
interesting to further analyze whether social entrepreneurs which were selected based on 
reputation and/or voluntary accountability efforts showed in fact integrity during the 
investment phase. Concerning a potential mission drift we investigated how investors try to 
avoid it prior to their investments. However, a mission drift could also be induced by 
investors themselves (Milligan & Schöning, forthcoming). It should be an interesting area for 




Achleitner, Heinecke, et al., forthcoming 
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Table I: Characteristics of participants 
 
Professionals 
Experience with social investment  Ø 5.6 (std. dev. 3.38; range 0.5-17) 
Professional Background  Business, N = 20  Social Sector, N = 20 
Highest Degree  University Degree, N = 34  PhD, N =6 
Gender  Male, N = 27  Female, N =13 
Students 
Course of Studies  Business, N = 35  Social Sciences, N = 5 
Gender  Males, N = 25  Female, N = 15 
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Table II: Definition of independent variables 
 
   
Attribute Definition Paramter values 
Pers. experience The social entrepreneur, close family members or friends are/ 
were directly affected by the social issue addressed by the social 
enterprise.
1 = affected, 0 = not affected
Prof. background Prior work experience: Social entrepreneurs who were mainly 
active in the business or mainly active in the social sector.
1 = mainly in social sector, 0 = mainly in business 
Vol. accountability efforts Initiatives of the social entrepreneur to increase accountability of 
the organization like disclosures, performance evaluations or 
external control.
1 = high, 0 = low
Awards / fellowships Stakeholders’ evaluation of the social entrepreneur which is based 
on information about past actions and performance. Stakeholders 
include for instance affiliates, experts from the sector or patrons.
1 = yes, 0 = no
Reputation Awards or fellowships granted to the social entrepreneur. 1 = high, 0 = not high   
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Table III: Regression results of expert sample
2 
 
2 The table presents the results of multilevel mixed-effect linear regressions with the utility value as dependent 
variable. The sample is based on real-time experiments with 40 social investment experts based on metricised 
limit conjoint analysis (MLCA). Each participant had to rank eight profiles in total and placed the limit card and 
wildcards where appropriate leading to 320 observations in total. The regression differentiates between variance 
on the first level, the decision on integrity (fixed effect), and on the second level, the individual participant 




   
Model 1: Without interaction Model 2: With interaction
Coefficient Standard error t-ratio Coefficient Standard error t-ratio
Pers. experience  - affected 0.925 0.293 3.155 *** 0.925 0.293 3.161 ***
Prof. background  - social 0.250 0.293 0.853 0.720 0.406 1.772 *
PBi x prof. background  - bussiness x social -0.940 0.564 -1.668 *
Vol. accountability efforts  - high 4.000 0.293 13.641 *** 4.000 0.293 13.669 ***
Reputation  - high 4.063 0.293 13.855 *** 4.063 0.293 13.882 ***
Awards / fellowships  - yes 1.738 0.293 5.926 *** 1.738 0.293 5.937 ***
Intercept -3.356 0.628 -5.345 *** -3.356 0.618 -5.427 ***
N 320 320
Log. Likelihood -814.424 -813.052
Chi² 423.825 *** 428.309 ***
Degrees of freedom 5 6
Independent Variables   
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Table IV: Regression results of student sample
3 
 
3 The table presents the results of multilevel mixed-effect linear regressions with the utility value as dependent 
variable. The sample is based on real-time experiments with 40 students based on metricised limit conjoint 
analysis (MLCA). Each participant had to rank eight profiles in total and placed the limit card and wildcards 
where appropriate leading to 320 observations in total. The regression differentiates between variance on the 
first level, the decision on integrity (fixed effect), and on the second level, the individual participant (random 
effect). All variables were standardized and group centered. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
   
Model 3: Without interaction Model 4: With interaction
Coefficient Standard error t-ratio Coefficient Standard error t-ratio
Pers. experience  - affected 1.819 0.298 6.110 *** 1.819 0.297 6.120 ***
Prof. background  - social 0.931 0.298 3.130 *** 0.242 0.796 0.300
PBi x prof. background  - bussiness x social 0.000 0.000 0.787 0.844 0.930
Vol. accountability efforts  - high 4.456 0.298 14.980 *** 4.456 0.297 15.000 ***
Reputation  - high 3.531 0.298 11.870 *** 3.531 0.297 11.890 ***
Awards / fellowships  - yes 1.969 0.298 6.620 *** 1.969 0.297 6.630 ***
Intercept -4.718 0.527 -8.960 *** -4.718 0.526 -8.970 ***
N 320 320
Log. Likelihood 807.631 -807.196
Chi² 456.220 *** 458.550 ***
Degrees of freedom 5 6
Independent Variables   
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Table V: Regression result for sample of experts and students interacted with status
4 
 
4 The table presents the results of multilevel mixed-effect linear regressions with the utility value as dependent 
variable. The sample is based on real-time experiments with 40 experts and 40 students based on metricised 
limit conjoint analysis (MLCA). Each participant had to rank eight profiles in total and placed the limit card and 
wildcards where appropriate leading to 640 observations in total. The regression differentiates between variance 
on the first level, the decision on integrity (fixed effect), and on the second level, the individual participant 
(random effect). The table was calculated by  including both samples into one data set and including an 
interaction term for each independent variable for the status (expert/student) of the participant. The interaction 




   
Coefficient Standard error t-ratio
Pers. experience  - affected 1.732 0.291 5.950 ***
Prof. background  - social 0.844 0.291 2.900 ***
Vol. accountability efforts  - high 4.369 0.291 15.020 ***
Reputation  - high 3.444 0.291 6.470 ***
Awards / fellowships  - yes 1.882 0.291 11.840 ***
Status x Pers. experience  - affected -0.719 0.404 -1.780 *
Status x Prof. background  - social -0.507 0.404 -1.250
Status x Vol. accountability efforts  - high -0.282 0.404 -0.700
Status x Reputation  - high 0.706 0.404 1.740 *
Status x Awards / fellowships  - yes -0.057 0.404 -0.140




Degrees of freedom 10
Independent Variables   
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5 The figure shows the ranking procedure used in our real-time experiment. The procedure was based on the  
metricised limit conjoint analysis (MCLA) as developed in Baierl and Grichnik (2010). 
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Figure II: Attribute contributions of expert sample
6 
 
6 The figure shows the attribute contributions of each independent variable based on multilevel mixed effect 
linear regressions on the expert sample. The sample is based on real-time experiments with 40 experts based on 
metricised limit conjoint analysis (MLCA). The attribute contributions are calculated using the coefficients of 
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Figure III: Difference in benefit contributions between Experts and Students
7 
 
7 The figure shows the differences of benefit contributions of the independent variables for the expert and the 
student sample. Reading Example: Experts rate “Reputation” 0.71 points higher than students. Differences were 
calculated by including both samples into one data set and including an interaction term for each independent 
variable for the status (expert/student) of the participant. Grey bars: coefficient significant on 10% level. 
 
 
         
 